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Complexity and Efficiency in Conservation Auctions:  
Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment 
 
Payment-for-ecosystem-services (PES) schemes fi-
nancially compensate producers for implementing 
various conservation practices on their properties that 
generate ecosystem-service benefits for society. Con-
servation auctions have been adopted in several PES 
programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) (Hellerstein et al., 2015) and involve producers 
submitting bids for one or more environmental prac-
tices for consideration in the auction.  
Both the general and conservation auction design and 
implementation literature have focused on how the 
auctioneer can generate improved auction perfor-
mance by modifying various auction features. One 
such feature is adopting different information revela-
tion strategies about various aspects of the auction. 
Procurement auctions in general, and conservation 
procurement auctions in particular, can be quite com-
plex for bidders, as the goods and services being pro-
cured are often evaluated based on multiple charac-
teristics in addition to their price, including quality, 
quantity, delivery time, etc. In these settings, provid-
ing additional information can facilitate bid construc-
tion and improve auction performance by reducing 
the difficulty of generating a successful bid. However, 
the improved auction performance resulting from 
information access that reduces the difficulty of bid 
formation must be evaluated against the possibility of 
increased rent premiums due to this additional infor-
mation. Another feature that is important to bidding 
and auction performance is the bid-submission proto-
col. One common protocol, the bid-menu format, 
involves all bidders submitting bids for all of their 
available practices, from which the auctioneer selects 
the best allocation per some criterion. A second pro-
tocol, the single-item format, requires the bidder to 
select one of the available practices for submission.  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  3-30-18 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  124.00  126.50  120.38 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  166.78  195.06  180.18 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  137.77  152.56  142.54 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  217.15  221.18  221.72 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  60.99  62.20  46.56 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75.47  77.46  69.83 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  145.56  137.80  142.74 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  347.91  363.22  366.53 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.84  4.67  NA 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.34  3.52  3.58 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  8.47  9.82  9.52 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.17  5.84  5.84 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.90  2.97  2.69 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  128.75  150.00  NA 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67.50  98.00  97.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  65.00  *  NA 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100.50  152.50  156.50 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42.50  50.25  50.50 
 ⃰ No Market          
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that pro-
vides a comparative analysis of the effects of information 
revelation and bid-submission protocol on auction perfor-
mance while also considering auction complexity in a multi
-round auction i.e. an auction where bidders submit bids 
through multiple iterations before a final set of winners is 
determined. We use an induced-value laboratory experi-
ment (involving student subjects) to address this gap in the 
literature. The results of our study provide some bench-
mark findings which can inform field experimental trials on 
conservation auctions which can involve actual producer 
participants. 
Experimental Design 
Experimental participants earned cash payouts based on 
their choices in the conservation auction in which they 
were endowed with three items for which they would sub-
mit bids to sell them to the regulator – the auctioneer. No 
conservation framing was used in the experiment. There 
were two information treatments implemented in a be-
tween subject format: Quality Value, in which participants 
were shown the magnitude of the environmental quality 
value of the three available items, and Quality Rank, in 
which only the relative ranking of the three items was re-
vealed. The bid-submission treatment (implemented in a 
within-subject format) compared outcomes in the Item and 
Menu treatments. The Item treatment involved participants 
submitting one bid for one of their items only. In the Menu 
treatment, participants submitted offers for all items. Given 
this experimental design, there were four treatments over-
all: Value-Item, Value-Menu, Rank-Item, and Rank-Menu. 
We conducted eight experimental sessions, each with 
twelve participants recruited from undergraduate student 
population at Fordham University. Participants earned a 
mean payment of $33.25, including a $10 show-up pay-
ment. Earnings were recorded in Experimental Currency 
Units (ECUs) and the experiment was conducted in Z-tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Each session included a Menu treat-
ment and an Item treatment, with Sessions 1 through 4 in-
volving Value treatments and Sessions 5 through 8 the 
Rank treatments. Within a session, each bid submission 
treatment included eight multi-round periods, with a mini-
mum of three and a maximum of five rounds per period. 
Participants were not informed of the fixed budget of 4,500 
ECUs, in each auction period, a figure that was constant 
across treatments. 
Each session included the four components: a paid risk 
preferences elicitation exercise (Holt and Laury 2002); an 
unpaid practice auction to familiarize participants with the 
user interface; and two experimental treatments on the ba-
sis of which participants were paid. Immediately prior to 
data collection, instructions were read aloud to participants 
to maintain an environment of common knowledge in the  
experiment. After bid submission in a round of the 
auction period was complete, offers were given a score 
equal to the quality of the submitted item divided by 
the offer price. These scores were then ranked in de-
scending order and bids were provisionally accepted 
based on their score until the budget was exhausted. 
Participants were informed whether or not their offer 
had been provisionally accepted at the end of the 
round. In the Menu treatments, the notification of pro-
visional acceptance specified which of the three items, 
if any, had been accepted. Participants then had the 
opportunity to adjust their offers in response to the 
information about the provisional status of their offer 
from the previous round, although the submitted offers 
could only be reduced in subsequent rounds of the pe-
riod. 
Auctions proceeded through the bid submission and 
winner determination routine to a subsequent round 
until the minimum of three rounds had been played. At 
this point, a stopping rule was evaluated to determine if 
the auction would end or if another round of bidding 
would be conducted. If the stopping rule was never sat-
isfied, the auction repeated through the maximum of 
five rounds. At the conclusion of each period, partici-
pants were informed about whether or not their offer 
had been accepted and winners' earnings were updated 
on the basis of the difference between their winning 
item's offer and its corresponding cost.  
Metrics of Analysis  
In order to analyze auction performance, we consider 
two metrics. The first metric termed Percentage of Op-
timal Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (POCER) measures the 
degree of cost-effectiveness of the conservation auction. 
POCER is defined as . In the numerator, 
 represents the sum of environmental benefits of 
all items accepted by the auctioneer from set of win-
ning bidders i and  represents the sum of select-
ed bids from set of winning bidders i representing the 
total expenditure of the auction. In the denominator 
 represents the sum of environmental benefits 
that would result from auction procurement if the reg-
ulator/auctioneer had full information about item costs 
(i.e. in the absence of asymmetric information) and 
 represents the sum of expenses in procuring the  
optimal set of items at cost. The second metric is termed 
Percentage of Optimal Score (POScore) and measures bid-
der-level rent seeking relative to the situation when the bid-
der submits their optimal item. The optimal item is the one 
which has the highest cost to benefit ratio. POScore is de-
fined as  where and  represents the quality 
and offer for the item selected and submitted by the subject 
in the auction. It is to be noted that in the Item treatment 
the POScore is computed for one item only since partici-
pants submit an offer for a single item only while in the 
Menu treatment, the metric is calculated for all three items. 
Similarly and represent the quality and cost associ-
ated with the optimal item for that bidder. This metric indi-
cates that for bidders’ optimal item, POScore value will not 
be influenced by that item’s environmental quality.  
Results  
Table 1 reports treatment effects for data pooled for every 
auction period and all sessions. We see that the total envi-
ronmental quality procured by the auctioneer is, on aver-
age, significantly (at 5% level) higher in the Rank treatment 
than in the Value treatment. Given that both treatments 
consider bidding on identical conservation action items, it 
is not surprising that total expenditures are not statistically 
different across treatments, though it is worth noting that 
the budget is, on average, not fully spent in either treat-
ment. Also, the average amount of quality provided per unit 
of expenditure is significantly higher in the Rank treatment. 
Moreover, the constant endowments across treatments 
leads to the same ratio of optimal quality per unit of ex-
penditure, so that the higher and significant POCER value 
in the Rank treatment can be attributed to the aforemen-
tioned higher mean quality per unit of expenditure. Observ-
ing Columns 4 through 6 of Table 1 to consider the impact 
of the bid-submission process on auction performance, we 
see that the total quality provided is significantly higher in 
the Menu treatment relative to the Item treatment. This 
leads to a higher ratio of actual to optimal quality in this 
treatment. Given the indistinguishable total expenditures 
across treatments, this leads to a significantly higher mean 
realized quality per unit of expenditure in the Menu treat-
ment. Finally, POCER is significantly higher in the Menu 
treatment than in the Item condition.  
Table 2 presents results of regression models that utilize a 
random-effects method, with standard errors clustered at 
the session level and confidence intervals generated through 
bootstrapping. Considering the results of Model 1, POCER 
is lower in each of the Value-Item, Rank-Item, and Value-
Menu treatments relative to the base Rank-Menu treatment. 
These results are robust, with similar magnitudes, when  
controlling for treatment experience (Model 2). Our 
results indicate that when the auctioneer is responsible 
for item selection in the Menu treatment, auction 
complexity is reduced which in turn facilitates bid for-
mation thereby improving auction performance. Ta-
ble 2 also indicates the tension inherent in the Value 
treatment - access to quality information makes it eas-
ier for bidders to identify their best item but simulta-
neously increasing the opportunity for increased rent-
seeking. The Value-Item treatment is the worst-
performing design of the alternative designs explored. 
Given the magnitudes of the coefficients on the Rank-
Item indicator, the results also suggest that the bid-
menu format is better able to reduce the complexity of 
bid formation and mitigate the rent-seeking opportu-
nities afforded through access to quality value infor-
mation. Finally, experience in the experiment is detri-
mental (although marginally so) to auction perfor-
mance.  
Next, we consider the determinants of POScore for all 
submitted final-round offers across all iterative auc-
tion periods for each treatment to obtain insights 
about bidding behavior. These results are presented in 
Table 3 and are somewhat unexpected. For bidders 
who submit offers for their optimal item, POScore will 
be independent of item quality and may be either in-
creasing or decreasing in item cost. For bidders who 
do not select the optimal item, POScore will be in-
creasing in item quality and decreasing in item cost. 
Considering the first row of Table 3, we see that the 
coefficient on item cost is negative and statistically 
significant in all treatments, save the Value-Item treat-
ment. In the Menu treatments, bidders had to gener-
ate offers for all available items. It is possible that bid-
ders might have generated intentionally-high, and 
thus unsuccessful, offers for their lower-score items to 
ensure that their optimal item would be accepted by 
the auctioneer. This behavior, potentially beneficial in 
the Menu treatments, is sub-optimal and decreases 
expected payoffs in the Item treatments. The negative 
coefficient on the cost variable in the Rank-Item condi-
tion suggests that the lack of accurate quality infor-
mation in this treatment is a real challenge to success-
ful offer formation. The results in the second row of 
Table 3 shows the relation between POScore and item 
quality. Although POScore should be independent of 
item quality if the optimal item is selected, we find 
that the coefficient is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. This relationship should only occur if partici-
pants were not submitting bids for their optimal item 
in the Item treatments. The result could be obtained in 
the Menu treatments if bidders knew that they were 
forming offers for their non-optimal items. To ensure 
that participants were able to identify successful strat- 
egies despite the complexity of some of the treatments, we 
present results in Table 4 of the same models as in Table 3, 
but only for bids that included the optimal item for each 
bidder.  
Here, we see that POScore is increasing in cost across all 
treatments. This result is intuitive, as rent-seeking is less 
viable for high-cost items. Although we are considering bids 
only for optimal items, we do see negative and significant 
relationships between POScore and item quality. This find-
ing suggests that these bidders are engaging in increased 
rent-seeking behavior for high-quality, optimal items, 
which is supported by the negative coefficients on the maxi-
mum-quality indicator variable, though these coefficients 
are only strongly statistically-significant in the Menu treat-
ments. These results are a testament to strategic bidding and 
gaming in the auction. Finally, considering the entire data 
set, there is a reduction in POScore in the Value-Item treat-
ment and Value-Menu treatments relative to the Rank-
Menu treatment, which confirms previous results.  
Conclusion:  
Our results show that providing ranked environmental 
quality information and removing item selection from the 
bid-submission process improves auction performance. 
While access to only ranked quality information means that 
participants cannot compute the exact score of their items 
to identify their optimal item for submission, this form of 
environmental quality information successfully reduces 
rent seeking. Overall, these countervailing effects lead to 
improved performance under both of the bid-submission 
protocols explored in our experimental setting. In addition, 
implementation of a bid-menu format relaxes the computa-
tional cost associated with bid formation, leading to a re-
duction in complexity contributing to improved perfor-
mance under both quality information treatments. We find 
that the bid-menu protocol can be useful in managing the 
trade-offs associated with the provision of quality infor-
mation to bidders in conservation procurement auctions. 
The finding that the treatment with ranked benefit infor-
mation and bid-menu format achieved the best auction per-
formance in our multi-round auction in which offer adjust-
ments across rounds were constrained to be reductions, 
highlights the importance of the choice of auction format. 
This outcome suggests that regulatory agencies might prefer 
to implement a conservation auction with a bid- menu sub-
mission protocol with ranked environmental-quality infor-
mation to enhance auction performance, while lowering the 
computational costs and hence private transaction costs 
associated with offer-formation.  
Providing environmental quality information can also pro-
mote greater auction transparency and hence producers' 
trust in the government, which could be useful in encourag-
ing their participation and subsequent enrollment of high- 
 quality lands in the PES program. One challenge to 
the policy-relevance of a bid-menu protocol is the 
extent to which procuring agencies possess suffi-
ciently-detailed understanding of the various conser-
vation practices available across the landscape and 
the cost involved in identifying the preferred subset 
of these practices that should be included for eligibil-
ity in the auction. Training of officials at procuring 
agencies and guidance offered to potential auction 
participants can thus be instrumental in effective 
implementing conservation auctions (Messer et al., 
2016). 
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Table 1. Period-level descriptive statistics 
  
Value 
Treatment 
Rank 
Treatment Difference 
Item 
Treatment 
Menu 
Treatment Difference 
Total quality provided 549.05 563.95 -14.91 547.36 565.64 -18.28 
 (4.32) (5.20) 0.0331 (4.56) (4.90) 0.0123 
Total expenditures 4,140.52 4,121.19 19.33 4,140.38 4,121.27 19.17 
 (23.85) (28.45) 0.500 (26.71) (25.78) 0.6320 
Average quality/ 
optimal quality 0.8721 0.8964 -0.0243 0.8697 0.8988 -0.0292 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.0501) (0.006) (0.007) 0.0071 
Average quality/ 
expenditures 0.1326 0.1369 -0.004 0.1323 0.1372 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) 0.0001 (0.001) (0.001) 0.0001 
Optimal qualities/ 
expenditures 0.1505 0.1505 0.0000 0.1505 0.1505 0.0000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 1.0000 (0.001) (0.001) 1.0000 
POCER 0.8814 0.9093 -0.0279 0.8789 0.9118 -0.0329 
 (0.004) (0.004) 0.0000 (0.005) (0.004) 0.0000 
Observations 64 64 128 64 64 128 
Notes: All offers. Standard errors in parentheses. The third and fifth columns report the difference between column 
one values and column two values and column three values and column four values, respectively with the p-value 
from a Wilcoxon rank-some test of the quality of each variable across the two samples presented beneath each 
difference. 
Table 2. Auction performance. Percentage of optimal cost-effectiveness ratio  
  Model 1 Model 2 
Value x Menu Treatment -0.0248*** -0.0190** 
 (0.0077) (0.0100) 
Value x Menu Treatment -0.0608*** -0.0550*** 
 (0.008) (0.0117) 
Rank x Item Treatment -0.0298*** -0.0298*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0070) 
Period Indicator  -0.0027* 
   (0.0015) 
Period x Item Interaction  -0.0013 
   (0.0022) 
Constant 0.9242*** 0.9362*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0062) 
Observations 128 128 
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of the optimal cost-effectiveness ratio achieved. The unit of 
observation is an auction period. The Rank-Menu treatment is the base case. Boot-strapped standard errors 
clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. One, two, and three stars indicate 10 percent, 
5percent, and 1 percent significance for a two-tailed hypothesis test based on a t distribution with 7 degrees 
of freedom, respectively. 
Table 3. Bidder behavior. Percentage of optimal score (final-round offers) 
  
Value  
x  
Menu 
Value 
 x 
 Item 
Rank 
 x  
Menu 
Rank 
 x 
 Item 
All  
Observations 
Cost -0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0000)) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Quality  0.0039*** 0.0016* 0.0043*** 0.0023*** 0.0036*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
MinCost 0.1182*** 0.0548*** 0.1251*** 0.0660*** 0.1079*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0138) (0.0023) (0.0126) (0.0030) 
MaxQual 0.0763*** 0.0409*** 0.0772*** 0.0386*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0108) (0.0024) 0.0054) (0.0033) 
Quality Value x Single Item Treatment     0.0012 
     (0.0051) 
Quality Rank Single Item Treatment     0.0203*** 
     (0.0076) 
Quality Value x Bid Menu Treatment     -0.0026 
     (0.0037) 
Period Indicator -0.0034*** 0.0015 -0.0025*** -0.0022 -0.0027*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0036) (0.0005) (0.0031) (0.0005) 
T Order 0.0059* 0.0149 -0.0095*** 0.0275* 0.0026 
 (0.0032) (0.0102) (0.0019) (0.0146) (0.0038) 
H and L Switching Round -0.0020* 0.0024 0.0037 0.0087 0.0007 
 (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0063) (0.0018) 
Constant 0.6203*** 0.5974*** 0.5831*** 0.5749*** 0.6010*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0965) (0.0195) (0.0377) (0.0165) 
Observations 1,152 384 1,152 384 3,072 
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of the optimal score achieved. The unit of observation is an auction period. 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. One, two, and three stars indicate 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance for a two-tailed hypothesis test based on a t distribution with 7 degrees of free-
dom, respectively.  
Table 4. Bidder behavior. Percentage of optimal scope (final-round offers for optimal items) 
  
Value  
x  
Menu 
Value 
 x 
 Item 
Rank 
 x  
Menu 
Rank 
 x 
 Item 
All  
Observations 
Cost 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0000)) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Quality  -0.0029*** -0.0038*** -0.0020*** -0.0021*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
MiniCost -0.0157** -0.0031 -0.0047 -0.0054 -0.0092*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0040) (0.0071) (0.0032) 
MaxQual -0.0278*** -0.0032 -0.0306*** -0.0096* -0.0195*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0026) 
Quality Value x Single Item Treatment        -0.0376*** 
         (0.0066) 
Quality Rank x Single Item Treatment         -0.0106 
         (0.0084) 
Quality Value x Bid Menu Treatment        -0.0141** 
         (0.0061) 
Period Indicator -0.0027** -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0031*** -0.0015*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0006) 
Torder 0.0070*** 0.0051 -0.0159*** 0.0225 0.0039 
 (0.0013) (0.0054) (0.0027) (0.0190) (0.0047) 
H and L Switching Round -0.0005 0.0020 0.0038 0.0059 0.0018 
 (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0044) 0.0048) (0.0019) 
Constant 0.9756*** 0.9270*** 0.9442*** 0.8911*** 0.9538*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0280) (0.0213) (0.0364) (0.0170) 
Observations 384 292 384 266 1,326 
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of the optimal score achieved. The unit of observation is an auction round. 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the session level are reported in parentheses. One, two, and three stars indicate 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance for a two-tailed hypothesis test based on a t distribution with 7 degrees of 
freedom, respectively.  
